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Abstract
In application-layer distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, zombie machines attack the victim server through
legitimate packets such that packets have legitimate format and are sent through normal TCP connections. Consequently,
neither intrusion detection systems (IDS) nor victim server can detects malicious packets. This paper proposes a novel
scheme which is called ConnectionScore to resist against such DDoS attacks. During the attack time, any connection
is scored based on history and statistical analysis which has been done during the normal condition. The bottleneck
resources are retaken from those connections which take lower scores. Our analysis shows that connections established
by the adversary give low scores. In fact, ConnectionScore technique can estimate legitimacy of connections with
high probability. To evaluate performance of the scheme, we perform experiments on Emulab environment using real
traceroute data of ClarkNet WWW server.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are categorized into two classes: network-layer DDoS
attacks and application-layer DDoS attacks. In network-layer DDoS attacks, attackers send a large number
of bogus packets (packets with bogus payload and invalid SYN and ACK number) toward the victim server
and normally attackers use IP spooﬁng. In network-layer DDoS attacks, the victim server or IDS can easily
distinguish legitimate packets from DDoS packets. In contrast, in application-layer DDoS attacks, attackers
attack the victim server through a ﬂood of legitimate requests. In this attack model, any zombie machine
has to establish a TCP connection with the victim server, which requires a genuine IP address; otherwise,
the TCP connection cannot be established. HTTP ﬂood is a well-known example of application-layer DDoS
attacks.
Most well-known DDoS countermeasure [1, 2] techniques are against network-layer DDoS attacks.
Those techniques cannot handle application-layer DDoS attacks. CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Pub-
lic Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) puzzles [3, 4] are one of the proposed techniques
against application-layer DDoS attacks. However, CAPTCHA puzzles suﬀer from some challenges which
we discuss them in the next section. This paper proposes a novel and systematic technique against these
attacks which is called ConnectionScore technique. Our goal is to design a technique such that tackles
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application-layer DDoS attacks without using CAPTCHA puzzles or uses minimum level of CAPTCHA
puzzles.
ConnectionScore technique proposes that during normal conditions, any server can measure various sta-
tistical attributes for its users and their traﬃc. The statistical attributes represent behavior and characteristics
of normal users. A server can keep the statistical attributes as a reference proﬁle. Now, when an attack oc-
curs against the server, the server assigns scores to the connections based on the reference proﬁle. It retakes
bottleneck resources from those connections which have gotten low scores. The key point is that the con-
nections which have been established by the attackers get low scores because they cannot have statistical
attributes of the normal users. Dropping suspicious connections is adjusted based on the current level of the
overload of the server. To evaluate the performance of the scheme, we perform experiments on the Emulab
environment using real logged data of ClarkNet WWW server as a case study. Our experiments show that
ConnectionScore scheme can precisely detect malicious connections and retake the bottleneck resources
from them.
2. Related work
In this section, we do not review countermeasure techniques against network-layer DDoS attacks. Two
useful surveys that collect these techniques are [1, 2]. The most promising technique against application-
layer DDoS attacks is CAPTCHA puzzles. A CAPTCHA puzzle [3, 4] is a type of challenge-response
test used in computing as an attempt to ensure that the response is generated by a human not by a ma-
chine. Any user must successfully solve a CAPTCHA puzzle before establishing a TCP connection with the
server. However, the CAPTCHA solution has the following challenges. (1) Patience of the users: several
reports [5, 6] show that these tests annoy the users and they are not user-friendly. Since many users have
little patience to solve a CAPTCHA test and wait for response, a site that uses CAPTCHA may drive away
legitimate users. (2) Breaking techniques: today, several image recognition techniques have been proposed
to break CAPTCHAs [7]. (3) Insecure implementation: some CAPTCHA protection systems can be by-
passed without using OCR (Optical character recognition) simply by re-using the session ID of a known
CAPTCHA image. (4) Labor attack: some reports [8, 9] indicate that there are free or cheap 3rd party hu-
man labor to break CAPTCHAs. The above challenges encourage us to ﬁnd a solution for application-layer
DDoS attacks that either do not need CAPTCHA test or uses it at the minimum level. Due to challenges
which we enumerated for the CAPTCHA techniques, researchers have attempted to solve application-layer
DDoS attack without using CAPTCHAs. Here, we discuss some of them.
Yatagai, et al. [10] propose two simple ideas: (1) when there are attacks from compromised clients
with the same virus or bot, the server can observe the same browsing order of pages continually at the
server, (2) attackers browse a web page for a shorter time than normal users; thereby if a user browses
a web-page shorter than a threshold time, it is considered as malicious. The ﬁrst idea does not work as
the attacker can set zombie machines to send requests for random pages. The second idea also does not
work as the attacker can browse a web-page for a longer time and simply pass the threshold. Thapngam et
al. [11] classiﬁes attack rate into two categories: predictable rate and nonpredictable rate. Predictable rates
include constant rate, monotonically increasing rate and periodical rate. However, nonpredictable rate has
no classiﬁcation. The author then proposes a Pearson correlation coeﬃcient theorem to detect predictable
rates for all three classes. However, they have no solution when attackers send requests at random and
unpredictable ranges. Xie and Yu [12] assume that normal users always access pages sequentially based on
hyperlinks organization, while attackers do not follow this organization and access random pages directly
using their URL. Then authors recognize attackers through the entropy test. Although, the ﬁrst assumption is
true, but the second assumption which is the base of the algorithm is not always true. We note that an attacker
can easily design a tool and ask zombie machines to follow pages based on the hyperlink organization. In
this case, the entropy value of attackers and normal users locate in the same range and the server cannot
detect zombie machines.
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3. Description of the ConnectionScore scheme
The basic idea of the ConnectionScore scheme is as follows. A server can measure various statistical
attributes for its users and their traﬃc during the normal condition when there is no attack against it. Un-
doubtedly, the measured statistical attributes represent behavior and characteristics of the normal users of
the server. These attributes are site-dependent which means that an outside attacker cannot be aware of such
statistical attributes. The server can consider the measured statistical attributes as a reference proﬁle and
use it during the attack time as a judgment reference point. When an application-layer DDoS attack occurs
against the server, the server assigns scores to connections based on the reference proﬁle. As can be seen
below, the connections which get lower scores are more probable to be the connections which have been
established by the attackers. In fact, the ConnectionScore scheme predicts legitimacy of connections with
high probability. In the next step, in a feedback-control process, the server retakes bottleneck resources from
the connections which have lower scores until its current load reaches below a threshold.
3.1. Attributes
A server can consider various attributes for users and their traﬃc. In this paper, we introduce some of
them, though other attributes can be discussed.
Request rate and download rate
The request rate represents the number of requests that a user sends to the server in a speciﬁc interval
time. The download rate represents the number of bytes that a user downloads from the server during a
speciﬁc interval time. The server measures request rate and download rate for diﬀerent random users during
diﬀerent random times a day, diﬀerent days, diﬀerent weeks, etc. Then the server can ﬁnd the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) for both request rate and download rate of normal users.
Uptime and downtime
The uptime represents a time that a user starts communication with the server until he terminates the
communication with the server. The downtime represents the interval time from the time that a speciﬁc
user disconnects from the server until the time he connects again to the server. The server randomly selects
users during diﬀerent times (days, weeks, etc.) and calculates their uptime. Although the downtime attribute
cannot be measured for all users as some users may either never connect again to the server or again connect
to the sever too late, surely some users reconnect every few days or several times a day. In this case, the
server can measure the downtime for such users. Next, the server can obtain CDF for both uptime and
downtime of normal users.
Browsing behavior
The browsing behavior of users of a web-site depends on two main factors: a) the structure of the website
and b) the behavior of users. Normally, any web-server composes of many numbers of web-pages that have
been organized hieratically through hyperlinks. The behavior of users indicates that which pages are more
favorite for users (page popularity). How much fraction of hyperlinks in a typical page is clicked by normal
users? And some other behaviors that we discuss them below.
Page classiﬁcation based on type: in several servers, pages can be virtually or logically classiﬁed based
on their types. For instance, a news web agency can classify its web-pages based on the type of the news:
politics, economics, culture, sport, etc. Then the server can measure request rate of each user for each
category. The collected data of diﬀerent users of diﬀerent times assists the server to depict CDF for each
category. Similarly, the CDF helps the server to consider a threshold rate for each category such that during
the attack time if a user has request rate more than threshold rate of a category, he gets negative score.
page access rate and page popularity: surely, any page has diﬀerent access rate. Some pages are
frequently requested by the users and some have very few requests. The result of web mining [13] shows that
in most cases, about 10% of the pages of a website draw 90% of the access. This attribute can signiﬁcantly
help the server to detect malicious connections as attackers are not aware of the popularity of pages and
thereby access to the pages randomly. The server can measure access rate for any page during a time
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interval. Then the server can measure popularity for each page as the following formula: pti =
ati∑N
j=1 a
t
j
. where
pti shows popularity of page i during time interval t; N is the number of pages and a
t
i is the access rate for
page i during the time interval t.
The key point is that the server classiﬁes pages based on their popularity into ﬁve major categories: very
low, low, medium, high and very high popular pages. Then, it classiﬁes any of the above major categories
into some smaller classes such that pages which have similar or nearly popularity locate in one class. Then,
for each class, the server depicts CDF of the percentage of requests of users for pages of each class. Next,
the server determines a threshold rate for each class based on CDF. During the attack time, if the percentage
of requests of a user exceeds the threshold rate for a class, he gets a negative score as explained below.
Hyperlink fraction click: suppose a page has k hyperlinks. What fraction of hyperlinks of a page is
clicked by a user? During the normal condition, a server can extract for each page a fraction of hyperlinks
on which a user clicks with a probability. Then the server can deﬁne a threshold for each page based on its
observation from normal users such that the higher deviation from the threshold, the higher the probability
to be a malicious user.
Hyperlink depth: let us explain this attribute with this question: how many sequential interlink pages
a user requests for? The depth (D) a user proceeds in hyperlink pages is an eﬀective attribute that a server
can extract for its normal users. Similarly, a server can compute CDF for this attribute.
There are also some other attributes in this category such as “out of time pages”, “repetitive pages” and
“ sequential-hyperlink pages” which we omit to represent them here due to page limit. Find them in [14].
Source IP address distribution
In most cases, source IP distribution of legitimate users is diﬀerent from source IP distribution of at-
tackers. While, distribution form of source IP addresses of legitimate users is more uniformly scattered
across the Internet; the distribution form of source IP addresses of attackers is more cumulative in some
places. This is because an adversary can catch several zombie machines in the same LAN or same area.
For instance, in a university or in a company, most users rely on central ﬁrewall that has been installed on
the gateway (they, themselves, do not care about installing ﬁrewalls or regularly update the tool); thereby, if
an adversary could break the ﬁrewall’s rules, he can capture several zombie machines from the same LAN.
Figure 1 shows an example of this attribute where the left image shows source IP address distribution of a
server just prior an DDoS attack (the right image). In fact, in some attacks, we can see the creation of several
clusters of source IP addresses; while before the attack there were no such clusters. The IP addresses within
the range of clusters are more suspicious to be the IP address of zombie machines. However, we should have
in mind that source IP distribution always cannot help, as the source IP distribution of zombie machines in
some attacks may be uniformly distributed across the Internet.
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Fig. 1: Source IP address distribution: a) just before attack, b) after attack
Arrival distribution rate of users
In any server, the arrival rate of users is diﬀerent during diﬀerent times a day. A server can measure
arrival rate of users for diﬀerent times a day, during diﬀerent days a week, month, etc. Hence, a server can
predict the arrival rate for diﬀerent times for future days. Normally, arrival rate of users follow the Poisson
distribution. The Poisson distribution theory indicates that if the expected arrival rate in an interval is λ,
436   Hakem Beitollahi and Geert Deconinck /  Procedia Computer Science  10 ( 2012 )  432 – 441 
the probability that k users connect the server during that interval is: f (k; λ) = λ
ke−λ
k! . For example if any
second, two users connect the system (λ = 2), then the probability that 20 users connect to the server during
a second is 5.8 × 10−14. In a DDoS attack, a large number of attackers simultaneously or in a short time
connect the server. According to the above probability, we can predict that most of the users that connect to
the system during that particular time are attacker’s machines.
3.2. Analysis of Attributes
Let us discuss the abilities of attributes and show that whether attackers can bypass attributes. An
attacker can thwart some attributes, but he encounters some diﬃculties and limitations. For instance, an
attacker can send request rate in the order of legitimate users or he can have download rate in the order of
legitimate users as well. But, the problem is that in such cases, the attacker should have numerous zombie
machines to be able to set up an eﬀective attack (i.e., meek attack, see below).
The attribute of “source IP address distribution” is somewhat in contradiction with attributes of “request
rate” and “download rate”. If an attacker tries to avoid creation of clusters of source IP addresses, then
he should use smaller number of zombie machines. In this case, the attacker can choose a set of zombie
machines from the pool of zombie machines that he has in such a way that IP address of zombie machines
are evenly distributed across the globe. But, the point is that in this case, the attacker should use a high rate
for request rate and download rate to have an eﬀective attack. On the other hand, if the attacker wishes that
all zombie machine have send/receive rates in the order of legitimate users, then he should use numerous
number of zombie machines for an eﬀective attack (meek attack). In this case, creation of clusters of source
IP addresses is inevitable!
Tackling the attribute of “arrival rate distribution” is not easy for the attacker. For instance, suppose in
a meek attack, the attacker uses 20000 zombie machines to bring down a server. If he organizes the attack
in such a way that every second, 10 zombie machines establish connections, then about 34 minutes are
required for completing the attack scenario. Moreover, the attribute of “uptime” is in contradiction with this
scheme because those zombie machines which have established connection earlier encounters the limitation
of “uptime” and get negative scores of uptime.
To bypass attributes of “hyperlink fraction click” and “hyperlink depth”, an attacker encounters a serious
challenge because these two attributes are in contradiction. First, we note that any page has a particular
threshold rate for “hyperlink fraction click”. Second, an attacker is not aware of these threshold rates.
However, an attacker may try to click small fraction of hyperlinks of each page to guarantee that he remains
below the threshold rate for each page. In this case, ﬁrst, an attacker does not know to select which particular
rate and does not know the selected rate is how much large or how much small regarding to the threshold
rate of diﬀerent pages. The second issue which is much important is that if an attacker chooses a small
fraction rate for click on each page, then he should proceed in depth. We note, in this case, the attacker get
negative score of attributes of “hyperlink depth”.
We believe an attacker cannot frustrate the attributes of “uptime”, “downtime”, “page classiﬁcation
based on type” and “page popularity” because these attributes are completely site-dependent and thus more
diﬃcult for an outsider attacker to collect such information. In [14], we show that attackers cannot bypass
the attribute of “page popularity”. However, due to page limit, we ignore to bring proof in this paper.
3.3. Computing scores
In this section we formulate the notion of score for each attribute and subsequently for each connection.
An established connection c has a set of attributes Aci , where A
c
1 could be the request rate, A
c
2, the download
rate, etc. Let S (Aci ) be the score of connection c associated with attribute Ai. We then calculate the total score
for connection c as the sum of scores of all attributes: S (c) =
∑n
i=1 S (A
c
i ); where n is the number of attributes.
Now, let us explain how the score of a connection is calculated for an attribute such as Ai. The score for
attributes of “request rate”, “download rate”, “uptime”, “page popularity”, “page classiﬁcation based on
type”, “hyperlink fraction click”, “hyperlink depth” and “arrival rate” is calculated as follows. Suppose
y = fi(x), where fi shows cumulative distribution function (CDF) for attribute Ai in the reference proﬁle.
Assume that the control unit has determined a pair of (xb, yb) as a reference baseline; so, yb = fi(xb). In
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the next section, we explain how the control unit through a feedback-control process selects the appropriate
baseline point. Assume that the value of the connection c for attribute Ai is shown by xci . The score of a
connection for mentioned attributes is calculated as the following formula:
S (Aci ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, if xci ≤ xb
−1 × kdiv( x
c
i −xb
Δx ) × xci −xb
Δx , if x
c
i > xb
(1)
where k is a geometric constant value (e.g., 1.2), div(m/n) shows quotient m per n and Δx is a constant
scale factor. As can be seen, the higher the deviation from the base-line value (i.e., xci − xb), the lower the
score which is decreased in a semi-geometric progression. Any server can select k and Δx appropriately
based on the volume of attack rate. The score for attribute of “downtime” is calculated as for the above
attributes, but in the reverse direction. The score for attributes of “source IP address distribution” is a
constant value: if a connection has been established from locations where we guess are the location of
attackers, the connection gets a constant score, for example −11; otherwise the connection gets zero.
3.4. Control unit
The goal of the control unit is to prevent exhaustion of bottleneck resources and, as a result, prevent
that the server goes down during the attack. To achieve this goal, the control unit deﬁnes three thresholds
for each bottleneck resources and deﬁnes three strategic states: red, yellow and green. For each bottleneck
resources, we deﬁne threshold1, threshold2 and threshold3 as 90%, 80% and 60% of total capacity of the
bottleneck resource, respectively2. When the load of a bottleneck resource exceeds threshold1, we say so
the situation of the bottleneck resource is in the red state. Whenever, traﬃc is controlled and the load of
the bottleneck resource returns below threshold2, but still is above threshold3, we say so the situation of
the bottleneck resource is in yellow state and ﬁnally, when the load of the bottleneck resource returns below
threshold3, we say so the situation of the bottleneck resource is in green (normal) state.
The control unit periodically checks status of the bottleneck resources of the server (e.g., bandwidth,
TCP/IP stack, CPU cycles, memory, etc.). Whenever the load of one of the bottleneck resources of the
server exceeds threshold1, the server goes to the freeze mode and control procedure is started. As long as
the server is in the freeze mode, it does not accept new connections. The next task of the red state is that the
control unit assigns scores to the established connections and then drops suspicious connections until the
load of bottleneck resource(s) has(ve) returned below threshold2. When the state of the system exits the red
state, the server exits the freeze mode and accepts new connections. When the system is in the yellow state,
whenever a request for a new connection (i.e., SYN packet) arrives, the control unit ﬁrst checks whether
the source IP address of the SYN packet is in the blacklist or not (see below). If it is in the blacklist, then
its previous score is summed up with the score of the “downtime” attribute. If it is not in the blacklist,
only score of “downtime” attribute is calculated for it. Then the score of the new connection is compared
with the score of established connections; if the lowest score of the system is lower than the score of the
new connection, the connection with the lowest score is dropped and the new connection is appropriately
established.
The control unit always follows the following rules: (Rule1:) the connections which get zero score are
not dropped. (Rule 2:) if score of a connection is equal or greater than a threshold (e.g., -10), the control
unit should send a CAPTCHA test for the user. If the user solves the test, the connection is not dropped;
otherwise, the connection is dropped. Let us call this threshold the “drop threshold”. (Rule 3:) if the score of
a connection is smaller than the drop threshold (e.g., -10), the connection is candidate for dropping without
need to test CAPTCHA puzzle with it. The control procedure is as follows.
1. The control unit initializes the baseline point for each attribute to a speciﬁc value. The decision
about initial value of baseline points can be made in the pre-attack stage. Normally, initial values are
selected such that minimum amount of false positive occurs; thereby they will be initialized to the
maximum amount such that false positive at the beginning are zero.
1The value of constant score can be discussed and it is possible that a server could extract a suitable value by its experience.
2These thresholds can be varied from a server to another server.
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2. The control unit monitors all established connections for duration of so called “score interval” (e.g.,
one minute) and then computes score for each established connection based on the baseline point for
that interval.
3. The control unit starts dropping connections from the connection which have the lowest score. It
continues dropping connections until either no connections with negative scores remain (considering
the rules) or the load of bottleneck resource(s) returns below threshold2.
4. If no bottleneck resource is in the red state, the server exits the freeze mode. If the state of at least one
bottleneck resource is in the yellow state, the control unit still calculates scores for the connections
and waits for new connections.
5. If the state of all bottleneck resources returns to the green state, the control procedure is terminated.
6. If at least one of the bottlneck resources is in the red state and there are no connections with negative
scores smaller than drop threshold (e.g., -10), the control unit changes the baseline point appropriately.
For all attributes except “downtime” and “source IP distribution”, the baseline point is changed as
follows: suppose in the CDF function of an attribute, (xb, yb) and (x′b, y
′
b) shows the current and next
baseline points, respectively. For the next base-line point, the control unit decreases yb by a Δy. So,
we have y′b = yb − Δy ⇒ x′b = f −1(yb − Δy). The amended baseline point, i.e. the next base-line
point would be ( f −1(yb − Δy), yb − Δy). The amount of Δy is considered appropriately, for instance,
0.1 or 0.05. For attribute of “downtime” the calculation is similar, but the direction is opposite. In
other words, for this attribute, we have (x′b, y
′
b) = ( f
−1(yb + Δy), yb + Δy). For attribute of “source IP
distribution”, there is no baseline point and the scores are calculated as before.
7. The algorithm returns to step 2. This loop is continued until the condition of step 5 is succeeded.
Here, we address some additional issues of the control unit. (1) It is not required that at each iteration of
the loop, baseline points for all attributes should be changed. Sometimes, the control unit may only change
baseline points for some attributes and not for all of them. (2) When a connection is dropped, the IP address
of the connection within its score is recorded in a list which is called blacklist. (3) A server can select a
suitable “drop threshold” before the attack time based on the maximum absolute value of negative scores
that legitimate connections may get.
4. Analyzing attributes for a case study
This section studies and analyzes the nature of the distribution of the mentioned attributes for a real
case-study in the Internet. Our case study is the real-life Internet traces collected from the traﬃc archive of
ClarkNet WWW server. The traces contain two week’s worth of all HTTP requests to this web server3.
Figure 2, parts a, b, c and d, shows cumulative distribution function for request rate, download rate,
uptime and downtime, respectively. Request rate: as can be seen more than 50% of users have request rate
per second less than 0.066. It means that more than 50% of users have sent a request to the server every 15
seconds. Moreover, more than 80% of users have request rate per second less than 0.25. As ﬁgure shows
about 10% of users have sent more than one request every two seconds. For this case study, we suggest
(xb, yb) = (0.5, 0.9) as an initial base-line point. Download rate: as the ﬁgure shows, more than 50% of
normal users have a download rate of less than 1000 bytes per second. More than 80% of users have a
download rate less than 3000 bytes per second. Moreover, only 10% of users have a download rate more
than 6000 bytes per second. We suggest (xb, yb) = (6000, 0.9) as an initial base-line point of this attribute
for this case-study. Uptime: as can be seen about 54% of users have stayed online for less than 1.5 minutes.
About 80% of users have an uptime less than 5 minutes and only 4% of users have an uptime more than 16
minutes. The point of (10, 0.9) can be considered as an initial base-line point for attribute of “uptime” in
this case-study. Downtime: as can be seen more than 50% of those normal users have downtime more than
8 hours and more than 80% of them have downtime more than 4 hours. Our analysis shows that only 0.3%
of users have downtime less than one hour. The point of (3, 0.1) can be considered as an initial base-line
point for this attribute.
3http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/contrib/ClarkNet-HTTP.html
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Fig. 2: Cumulative distribution function for (a) request rate/second, (b) download rate/second, (c) uptime and (d) downtime
Figure 3.a shows distribution of page popularity for day 3 between 11:00 to 14:00 o’clock. As discussed
above, we divide pages based on their popularity into ﬁve major categories: very low, low, medium, high
and very high popular pages. Next, for more accuracy, any of the above major categories may divided
into some smaller classes. Figure 3 shows that pages of class 1 compose very low popular class; pages of
classes 2 and 3 compose low popular class; pages of classes 4 to 12 compose medium popular class and
ﬁnally pages of classes 13 to 17 and 18 to 19 compose high and very high popular classes, respectively. In
Figure 3, popularity of class i is more than class j when i > j. Figure 3.b shows threshold rate (percentage)
for diﬀerent classes based on CDF of 90% to 95% (depending on the class) for four diﬀerent days. As can
be seen, the threshold rate of a speciﬁc class is in a similar range for diﬀerent days. So, we can determine
an upper bound and ﬁxed threshold rates for classes independent from days.
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Fig. 3: Page popularity: (a) Frequency rate for diﬀerent classes of pages, (b) threshold rate for diﬀerent classes of page popularity
Figure 1.a shows source IP distribution for duration of 5 minutes of day 6. As can be seen, users are
scattered uniformly across the Internet. Figure 4 shows arrival distribution rate for day 1 and day 12. As can
be seen arrival rate is diﬀerent for diﬀerent times a day. In both days, the arrival rate after mid-night between
01:00 to 07:00 is lower than other parts of day. The arrival rate between 11:00 to 16:00 is maximum. The
average arrival rate for this period of the day is about 27 users per minute. As can be seen in the maximum
case less than 50 users have connected to the server during a minute; in other words, less than one user per
second.
5. Experimental results
To evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the ConnectionScore scheme, we set up some experiments on the Emulab
environment. In these experiments, we simulate day 6 of Clarknet www server. We generate 3559 pages
with diﬀerent sizes according to distribution of ﬁle sizes of day 6 before 14:00 o’clock and then upload them
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Fig. 4: Arrival distribution rate: a) day 1 and b) day 12
in the server. In the experiments, legitimate clients follow all attributes of the real users of Clarknet www
server. We assume that the attack is started at time 14:03. We set the bandwidth of the server to 106 bytes
per second.
In these experiments, we are interest to see 1) score distribution of connections, 2) how fast the server
can recover from the attack, 3) percentage of false positive and false negative, 4) percentage of candidate
connections for false positive and 5) percentage of the legitimate connections that get negative scores (RL)
and also percentage of the malicious connections that do not get negative scores (RA). We evaluate the
scheme against two types of attacks: 1) common attacks and 2) meek attack. For the common attack, we
follow a real scenario to model this attack which has been represented in [10]. In this scenario, attackers
use three viruses programs: Netsky.Q, Trojan Sientok and BlueCode.Worm to send HTTP GET requests
to the server. These virus programs send the requests in about 300 milliseconds, 250 milliseconds and 137
milliseconds, respectively. In this experiment, 150 machines play the role of attackers. For the meek attack,
600 attackers create TCP connection and follow attributes of request rate and download rate of legitimate
clients. In other words, request rate and download rate of attackers are in the order of legitimate users.
Figure 5.a and 5.b show score distribution for established connections when the server is under the
common attack and the meek attack, respectively. Red bars show score of malicious connections and green
bars show score of legitimate connections. As can be seen, about 25% of legitimate connections get negative
score, but with small absolute values (maximum 11). In the common attack, most of malicious connections
get very low scores (i.e., negative scores with high absolute values). The reason is that users’ high request
rate leads to high negative values in most of attributes. We observe that the largest and lowest negative
score in the common attack are −7485.65 and −2.60E + 06, respectively. In the meek attack, all malicious
connections do not get negative scores and moreover, the absolute value of negative scores is much lower
than the common attack. We observe the largest and lowest negative score in the meek attack are 0 and
−2585.3, respectively.
Figure 5.c shows bandwidth rate occupied by legitimate traﬃc and attack traﬃc during the meek attack
(for the common attack we have the similar situation). At time 14:03, the attack is started and the server
goes to the freeze mode. One minute (score interval) after starting the attack, the control unit drops enough
number of connections with negative scores such that bandwidth rate drops below threshold2. At this time
(14:04) the server exits the freeze mode and accepts the new connections. The control unit replaces the
established connections with lowest scores by new connections until the bandwidth drops below threshold3.
Then the duty of control unit terminates. During 14:03 and 14:04, the bandwidth rate of good traﬃc slowly
decreases because some legitimate users normally leave the system.
To calculate the percentage of false positive (FP), false negative (FN), the percentage of legitimate
connections for possible false positive (PFP), RL and RA, we repeat the experiments 30 times during diﬀerent
times of a day. On average 6.3% of malicious connections do not get negative score in the meek attack; while
all malicious connections get negative score in the common attack. So, the percentage of false negative and
RA is 6.3%. On average 24% of legitimate connections get negative score. Finally, on average, 2% of
legitimate connections get score lower than -10 (the drop threshold); thereby, 2% of legitimate connections
could be candidate for possible drop without asking them to solve the CAPTCHA tests.
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Fig. 5: Experiments: (a) score distribution in a common attack, (b) score distribution in a meek attack and (c) bandwidth rate occupied
by good traﬃc and attack traﬃc
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes the ConnectionScore scheme against application-layer DDoS attacks. In this scheme,
connections get score based on their behaviour. With a high probability, the connections which get lower
scores are malicious connections; thereby the server retakes bottleneck resources from them. Our exper-
imental results on Emulab environment indicate that the ConnectionScore scheme can eﬀectively handle
application-layer DDoS attacks for both common and meek attacks. We believe that the administrators of
web-sites do not need to annoy their users by forcing them to solve CAPTCHA tests. Moreover, CAPTCHA
tests are not so reliable. Therefore, the ConnectionScore scheme can be eﬀectively considered as an alter-
native technique to handle application-layer DDoS attacks.
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